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Abstract 
The failure of competition and the consequent high and sticky interest rates in 
credit card markets have been the subject of a considerable amount of debate and 
research lately. This paper presents the first regression testing for the existence of 
price competition in a credit card market to be estimated free of dynamic panel bias 
using recent quarterly data from Turkey. The estimation reveals that even though the 
effect of the cost of funds on credit card rates is statistically significant, it is very 
weak. The paper thus provides empirical evidence for the failure of price competition 
in the Turkish credit card market. 
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THE FAILURE OF PRICE COMPETITION IN THE TURKISH 
CREDIT CARD MARKET 
 
I. Introduction 
The level of credit card interest rates in Turkey remained persistently high 
despite the recent substantial declines in the cost of funds and in the other consumer 
credit interest rates. While banks swiftly reflected the increase in the cost of funds 
during the November 2000 and February 2001 crises to credit card interest rates1, 
their response to the decline in the cost of funds afterwards was very slow. Overnight 
interest rates, which may be considered as the cost of funds in the credit card 
business, declined from 44 percent to 15.75 percent in the 2003-2007 period. 
However, the weighted average interest rate in the credit card market barely declined 
from 85 percent in 2003 to 60 percent in the in 2005 and rose again to 80 percent in 
2007 (Graph 1).  
A similar downward-sticky interest rate trend has not been observed in the 
other consumer credit (vehicle, housing, etc.) markets. Interest rates in these markets 
closely followed the decline in the cost of funds. The major reason of the decline in 
these interest rates was the increasing competition in consumer banking in 2000s. 2 
In the credit card market, on the other hand, card-issuing banks adopted strategies to 
enhance customer loyalty and have been competing with non-price features (number 
of installments, card limits, rewards, etc.). 
                                                 
1 The weighted average credit card interest rate rose from 107% in the first quarter of 2000 to 181% in 
the second quarter of 2001. Some banks stopped advancing cash and reduced credit card limits in this 
period. See Aysan and Muslim (2006). 
2 The main source of profits for the banking industry throughout the 1990s was lending the 
government at high interest rates. This “low-risk, high return” period ended with the November 2000 
and February 2001 financial crises. The tight fiscal policy after the crisis and the accompanying stand-
by agreement with IMF have been beneficial in establishing stability in the economy. Due to lower 
inflation and higher growth rates, government bonds lost their attractiveness and banks shifted their 
focus to consumer credits market. Consequently, interest rates and profit margins in consumer credit 
markets decreased to competitive levels quickly with the increasing competition. 
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Graph1: Credit Card Interest Rates vs. Other Credit Interest Rates in Turkey 
 
Source: Central Bank of Turkey 
 
High and sticky credit card interest rates are not unique to Turkey. Credit card 
interest rates are higher than other consumer credit interest rates all over the world. 
Empirical evidence from other countries indicates that credit card interest rates are 
also downward-sticky and show asymmetric response to the changes in the cost of 
funds. In his seminal paper, Ausubel (1991) showed that although there were about 
4,000 banks in the US credit card market and in that sense the market fitted the 
perfect competition model, the response of credit card interest rates to the decline in 
the cost of funds was very slow in the 1983-1987 period.3  
The Turkish credit card market has grown enormously in the recent years, 
becoming the third biggest market in Europe after England and Spain in terms of 
card numbers and the tenth biggest in terms of transaction volume. With 37.4 million 
cards, a transaction volume of TRY 141.5 billion was obtained in 2007, reaching 
15% of GDP. There are currently 21 card-issuing banks and the six largest banks 
                                                 
3 Moreover, he calculated that banks earned 3-4 times the ordinary rate of return of the banking 
industry from their credit card business in that period. 
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control 87% of the market. The high concentration of the market, the prevailing non-
price competition and the high and sticky interest rates suggest that banks exercise 
market power. With these concerns, presumably, the Central Bank started to impose 
a ceiling on credit card rates in 2006. Further regulations of credit card interest rates 
are on the agenda of the government. Card issuing banks, contrarily, argue that the 
competition in the Turkish credit card market is fierce, and any further price 
regulations will cause banks to reduce the quality and availability of their credit card 
services, hurting the Turkish economy. 
In order to design and implement effective and efficient regulations, a 
rigorous analysis of the nature of competition in the market is necessary. In this 
study, the experience of the Turkish credit card market in recent years is examined 
and the price competition in this market is empirically analyzed by employing a 
quarterly data set of average credit card interest rates of all issuers in Turkey for the 
period between the second quarter of 2001 to the last quarter of 2006. 
Ausubel (1991) and Aysan and Muslim (2006) empirically analyzed the 
response of credit card interest rates to the changes in the cost of funds for the US 
and Turkish markets respectively, by using conventional fixed and random effects 
panel data models and instrumental variable techniques. We employ dynamic panel 
data models to better measure the response of credit card interest rates to the changes 
in the cost of funds. In that sense, we improve the methodology used in previous 
studies for similar estimations. Moreover, we cover an extended time period 
compared to the Aysan and Muslim (2006) study with the availability of new data. 
System GMM regressions are run on a dynamic panel data model and it is shown that 
credit card interest rates are economically insensitive to the changes in the cost of 
funds. This result is an indication of the failure of price competition in the market. 
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The organization of the paper is as follows: In the next part, a brief summary 
of the recent developments and regulations in the Turkish credit card market is 
provided. In the third part, we survey the literature that examines price competition 
in credit card markets. In the fourth part, we empirically test for the existence of 
price competition in the Turkish credit card market. Lastly, section five concludes. 
II. The Turkish Credit Card Market 
Even though the first credit cards entered the Turkish market in 1968 with 
Diners Club, they were accessible only to high-income people and accepted at a 
small number of stores for more than two decades. There were only 554 thousands 
credit cards in Turkey in the early 1990s. High inflation rates, frequent economic 
crises and the consequent increases in consumer default rates delayed the 
development of the credit card market in the 1990s (Aysan and Muslim, 2006).  
The rapid development of the market started in the late 1990s and accelerated 
in 2000s. The number of credit cards increased almost threefold from 13.6 million to 
37.3 million between January 2002 and December 2007. The tremendous increase in 
the number of points of sales (POS) from 382 thousand to 1.5 million during the 
same period reflects the widespread acceptance of credit cards by merchants and vast 
investments made by banks in the credit card business (Table 1). Not only the 
number of cards but also the total and average volumes of transactions made by 
credit cards increased. The total volume rose from TRY 24.5 billion in 2002 to TRY 
141.5 billion in 2007, reaching 23.4 percent of total private consumption spending 
(Graph 2). Transaction volume per card increased from TRY 170 to TRY 373 in the 
same period.  
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Table 1: Developments in the Turkish Credit Card Market  
Year 
Total Number of 
Credit Cards 
(million) 
Total Value of 
Credit Card 
Transactions 
(billion TRY) 
Number of POSs 
(thousand) 
2002 15.7 24.5 495.7 
2003 19.9 39.4 662.4 
2004 26.7 64.6 912.1 
2005 30.0 85.3 1,141.0 
2006 32.4 108.4 1,282.7 
2007 37.3 141.5 1,453.9 
Source: Interbank Card Center 
 
 
Graph 2: Credit Card Transaction Volume and Total Private Consumption Spending 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Turkey and Interbank Card Center 
Note:  Transaction Volume includes cash withdraws with credit cards. 
 
A number of benefits that credit cards provide such as not having to carry 
cash, being able to borrow at any time, enjoying the benefits of online shopping and 
gaining rebates, money points, actual gifts and travel miles increased their 
attractiveness for consumers. They also benefited from being able to pay in 
installments without any surcharge over the cash prices of goods, while merchants 
preferred credit cards over traditional methods of sales with installments, since credit 
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Graph 3: Distribution of Credits in the Turkish Banking Sector by Types 
ansferred the default risk and the cost of collecting receivables to banks. 
Besides their increasing popularity as a payment instrument, credit cards also 
gained widespread usage as a credit instrument. Total revolving debt, excluding 
balances from installments, went up from TRY 6.3 billion in 2005 to TRY 8.1 billion 
in 2007. The ratio of revolving credit card debt to total outstanding balances was 
30.50 percent in 2007, reflecting that an important number of consumers borrowed 
on their credit cards in spite of abnormally high interest rates. However, the share of 
credits provided by credit cards in total credits exhibits a stable trend in recent years 
at around 10 percent (Graph 3). This indicates that other credit markets also grew 
significantly in recent years due to the shifting focus of banks from the governm
bond market to industrial, commercial and consumer credit markets. 
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Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency of Turkey and Central Bank of Turkey 
At the same time, the number of consumers who were in credit card debt 
delinquency increased sharply despite buoyant economic growth, low inflation, and 
political and economic stability in the recent years. The number of delinquent 
consumers more than doubled, rising from 415 thousand in January 2005 to 950 
Source: 
 
thousand in July 2007. Delinquent credit card loans, meanwhile, increased from TRY 
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311 million to TRY 1.8 billion between January 2004 and June 20064.  
Looking at the supply side of the market, there are 21 credit card issuers in 
Turkey.5,6 Three of them are public banks and eight of them are foreign banks. All of 
these issuers provide general corporate and individual banking services at the same 
time. The credit card market is quite concentrated. The market share of the six largest 
issuers is 87 percent in total outstanding balances and 80 percent in the number of 
customers (Table 2). 
Table 2: The Six Largest Issuers in the Turkish Credit Card Market (June 2007) 
Bank 
Market Share (%) 
(Outstanding Balances) 
Market Share (%) 
(Number of Customers) 
Yapi Kredi 24.8 24.7 
Garanti 20.8 13.3 
Akbank 14.5 12.6 
Isbank 12.4 11.9 
Finansbank 7.6 9.6 
HSBC 7.1 8.1 
Six largest issuers 87.1 80.2 
Sector 100.0 100.0 
Source: Central Bank of Turkey 
21 issuers should be enough to establish price competition in the market. 
However, banks’ reluctance to decrease credit card rates in response to the decline in 
the cost of funds indicates that competition in the market is not concentrated on 
prices. Especially the largest issuers focus on strategies that will increase customer 
loyalty by providing non-price benefits to credit card customers. Until the imposition 
of the price ceiling in June 2006, they charged higher than average credit card 
interest rates, and they set their rates at the ceiling level afterwards. On the other 
hand, small issuers and public banks charged lower than average rates during the 
                                                 
4 Data for outstanding credit card balances, delinquent credit card loans, revolving credit card debt, 
and the number of credit card consumers are obtained from the Central Bank of Turkey. 
5 In this study we do not consider the four small financial institutions which do not charge interest for 
credit cards. 
6 Kocbank and Yapi Kredi merged under Yapi Kredi in the second half of 2006. This merger 
decreased the number of issuers in the market to 21. However in the empirical part of the paper we 
include data for 22 issuers since we cover the period until the second half of 2006. 
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sample period, though still not succeeding in improving their market shares. This 
failure is an indication that on average customers are more concerned about non-
price benefits than interest rates. 
An important dimension of the non-price competition among issuers in 
Turkey is the number of the point of sales. Banks are not able to offer some non-
price benefits such as large numbers of installments, rebates and gifts for credit card 
transactions made through the POS’s of other issuers. Thus consumers prefer to have 
the credit card of the issuers with large POS networks. The market leaders of credit 
card issuers also have the largest POS networks. This puts the smaller banks with 
smaller POS networks at a considerable disadvantage in non-price competition.  
The high concentration in the market, and the high and sticky credit card 
interest rates point to the market power of these issuers. These, coupled with the 
increasing complaints from card holders and consumer organizations, paved the way 
for the first regulation in the credit card market in 2003, which was proved to be not 
very effective in reducing the credit card interest rates (Aysan and Yildiz, 2007). 
Consequently, the Bank and Credit Cards Law was enacted on March 1, 2006. 
Authorized by this law, the Central Bank started imposing an interest rate ceiling at 
the beginning of each quarter, determined by adding 0.5 percentage points to the 
weighted average of credit card rates in the market. 
 However, most of the banks, especially larger banks, set their credit card 
rates at the maximum level allowed by the ceiling. These rates are perceived to be 
still very high by consumer organizations and the public at large. They deem further 
regulations to be necessary. Banks, on the other hand, claim that the industry is 
competitive, and that further regulations will seriously harm the profitability of the 
credit card business. In this case, banks may be compelled to reduce the quality and 
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availability of their services, which would in turn discourage credit card usage and 
lead to economy-wide consequences. The resulting liquidity and credit constraints 
will prevent consumers from smoothing their consumption, thus reducing welfare. 
Moreover, credit card usage is expected to decrease the size of the informal economy 
and increase tax revenue. Retailers support banks as well, fearing that their sales will 
decline. All these debates show that a rigorous analysis of the nature of competition 
in the market is necessary in order to design and implement effective and efficient 
regulations.  
III. Theoretical Background 
As a credit instrument, credit cards are inherently more costly than other 
credit types. To begin with, as they are uncollateralized, loans extended through 
credit cards expose banks to higher default risk. Credit cards also entail high liquidity 
risk. Banks commit to lending any amount up to the credit card limit, and the 
utilization of this credit, by withdrawing cash for instance, is solely at the discretion 
of consumers. As banks ex ante do not have information as to when and how much 
they are going to lend to credit card consumers, they have to keep provision equal to 
the difference between total credit card limits and total outstanding balances. Banks 
secure themselves against this liquidity risk by keeping short-term, low-yield 
securities or by being prepared to borrow short-term expensive funds (Shaffer and 
Thomas, 2007). In that sense, funding of credit cards is more expensive than funding 
of other credit types. Furthermore, operating a credit card system entails huge 
investments in technology and other infrastructure. Banks also provide credit card 
consumers with many non-price benefits to such as money points, gifts and travel 
miles which again entail high costs. Lastly, credit card consumers do not make any 
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payment during the grace period, which can be forty-five days in Turkey, and banks 
have to finance the card holders’ purchases in this period. 
All these factors are related to the nature of the credit card business, but 
explain the high cost of credit card borrowing only in part. When we consider that 
credit cards turn out to be the most profitable line of business for some banks in 
Turkey, credit card interest rates still seem to be very high, even after controlling for 
the above costs.7 This observation suggests that the reasons for high credit card rates 
lie somewhere else. 
 There are various explanations for high credit card rates in the literature. A 
leading explanation is based on the customer structure in credit card markets. 
Chakrovarti (2003) classifies customers into two groups according to their credit card 
usage behavior: convenience users who regularly pay their bills at the end of the 
grace period, and revolvers who use the credit option of their cards. Chakrovarti 
argues that the level of credit card interest rates is related to the relative ratios of 
these two groups. Convenience users are not profitable for issuers. Consumers in this 
group use their credit cards only as a means of payment. Additionally, they benefit 
from rewards, rebates, etc., that depend on credit card usage. Hence, their costs in the 
non-interest bearing grace period are financed through the interest income from 
revolvers. Since 30 – 40 percent of the customers in the US credit card market are 
convenience users8, there are two revolvers for each convenience user. The ratio of 
convenience users in Turkey is 78 percent.9 This means that each revolver is 
financing three convenience users. It has been argued that this consumer structure in 
                                                 
7 Ausubel (1991) documents similar evidence for the US market. 
8 Predictions for 2003. Chakravorti (2003) 
9 ICC, Bank and Credit Card Usage Survey, May 2008 
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the market is an important reason of the extremely high credit card interest rates in 
Turkey. 
Despite the existence of sufficient numbers of competitors, Ausubel (1991) 
accounts for the failure in achieving competitive rates in credit card markets with low 
price elasticity on the demand side, emanating from search cost, switch cost and 
consumer irrationality, and asymmetric information on the supply side. Stating that 
search and switch costs are not sufficient to explain price stickiness, he categorizes 
credit card holders in three groups. The first group is made up of convenience users 
who never borrow and hence are insensitive to interest rates. These customers are not 
risky for a bank; however, they are costly and do not yield any profit opportunities. 
The second group includes consumers who exhibit some sort of irrationality: they do 
not intend to borrow ex-ante, but somehow end up doing so ex-post. These 
consumers are generally low-risk and pay their debt, hence they are the preferred 
consumer group for banks. Since they do not plan to use the credit option of their 
cards ex-ante, their perceived expected benefit from switching to a lower rate card is 
lower than the cost of switching for these consumers. Therefore, they are not 
sensitive to credit card rates. Consumers in the third group plan to use the credit 
option of their cards, they are illiquid, and hence are risky and not preferred by 
banks. These customers are sensitive to interest rates because they actually intend to 
borrow and pay their debt. According to the new adverse selection theory suggested 
by Ausubel (1991), in a situation where banks cannot differentiate between these 
three consumer types, a bank that unilaterally lowers its interest rate will attract only 
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the consumers in the third group10. This theory is one of the fundamental 
explanations of banks’ reluctance to compete in prices. 
Calem and Mester (1995) and Calem, Gordy and Mester (2006) introduce 
impatience and by mingling it with search and switch costs, define another set of 
categories to assess credit card holders. Their first category consists of patient 
customers with low search costs and high price elasticity of demand. They have low 
credit card balances and hence are not profitable for banks. The second category 
includes low-risk and impatient credit card holders. These consumers do not want to 
postpone consumption and have high search costs. They are profitable for banks as 
they carry high balances. Impatient credit card holders with high default risk, high 
search costs and high balances constitute the third category. They are not desirable 
for banks. Asymmetric information again results in sticky prices. If a bank lowers its 
interest rate in the presence of search costs only, it merely attracts customers from 
the non-profitable first category. Switching costs can affect interest rates in two 
ways. If credit card balances (but not the types of customers) can be observed by all 
banks and are taken to indicate risk, then the consumers in the second and third 
categories will have high switching costs because they will need to reduce their 
balances in order to be able to get new cards. A decrease in credit card interest rate 
will thus only attract the consumers in the first category. If the types are known only 
by their own banks, banks increase switching costs for the consumers in the second 
category, for example by offering higher limits, so that they do not respond to rate 
reductions of other banks. Any unilateral interest rate cut by a bank in this situation 
will thus attract only the undesirable first and third types of customers. 
                                                 
10 The well-known Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) adverse selection theory predicts an opposite outcome. 
Only high-risk consumers respond if a bank unilaterally increases its interest rates. Hence, this bank’s 
risk position worsens and its expected future profits decrease. Ausubel argues that the Stiglitz-Weiss’ 
theory fits more collateralized credits, while his own theory is better for uncollateralized credits. 
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Search cost and asymmetric information explanations for high credit card 
rates are less relevant for the Turkish market. There are a number of factors that 
decrease the search cost for consumers in Turkey. First of all, the Banking 
Regulatory and Supervisory Agency (BRSA) of Turkey and the Central Bank of 
Republic of Turkey (CBRT) publish all the relevant information about credit cards 
like interest rates, benefits, etc., and update this information monthly. Therefore, 
consumers do not need much time and effort to obtain information about different 
credit cards. Secondly, there are only 21 issuers. This number is very small compared 
to the average number of issuers from which a consumer in the US or Europe have to 
choose.  
In Turkey, the asymmetric information problem is not a serious issue either. 
Firstly, there is a developed information-sharing system among banks which 
eliminates interbank information asymmetries. Through the Credit Bureau of Turkey, 
each bank can have access to information about the credit positions of other banks’ 
customers. Moreover, advancements in risk management and information technology 
have provided banks with better means for screening default risks of the credit card 
consumers. The Credit Bureau of Turkey assists credit institutions in this respect as 
well by providing them with risk monitoring and evaluating services. Therefore, 
banks are now able to differentiate between high and low risk customers at lower 
costs. 
 We believe that the switching cost and non-price competition through 
product differentiation arguments are more valid for the Turkish credit card market. 
To enhance customer loyalty and increase switching costs, banks provide non-price 
credit card benefits like money points, actual gifts, travel miles and higher number of 
installments, and improve the quality of their general banking services. We 
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extensively deal with the switching cost and non-price competition arguments in 
another paper (Akin et al, 2009). 
IV. Empirical Analysis of the Credit Card Rates in Turkey 
Previous studies stress that the main determinant of the marginal cost for 
credit card issuers is the cost of funds. In addition, the cost of funds is the only part 
of the marginal cost that changes relatively frequently (Ausubel, 1991; Budde 2001). 
Therefore credit card interest rates are expected to move together with the cost of 
funds in the continuous spot market equilibrium (Ausubel, 1991). Credit card 
operations of banks must be funded with short-term funds because of the unexpected 
liquidity constraints arising from the nature of credit cards. Hence, overnight interest 
rates or interest rates on short-term government bonds are likely proxies for the cost 
of funds in the credit card sector. Ausubel (1991) employs the T-bill interest rates in 
the US to account for the cost of funds. Similarly, in this paper the overnight interest 
rates, which display a parallel movement to T-bill rates, are used to proxy the cost of 
funds.  
IV.1. The Model 
In order to analyze the response of credit card interest rates to the changes in 
the cost of funds, these rates are regressed on their own lags and the lag of the cost of 
funds as:  
rateit = α ratei,t-1 + β costi,t-1 + ηi + νit ,    (1) 
where “rate” is the credit card interest rates of the issuers in the Turkish credit card 
market and “cost” is the interest rate on the Treasury Bills proxying the cost of funds. 
Fixed effects are captured by ηi, and νit stands for idiosyncratic error terms. The data 
is quarterly, spanning the time period from the second quarter of 2001 to the last 
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quarter of 200611. 
If OLS is used to estimate equation (1), a dynamic panel bias occurs due to 
the fact that the lagged dependent variable, ratei,t-1, is correlated with the fixed effects 
and therefore is endogenous. Thus, the estimated coefficients would be inconsistent 
and the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable would be upward biased as a 
result of this positive correlation. 
When we apply mean transformations to equation (1) we obtain: 
rate*it = α rate*i, t-1 + β cost*i,t-1 + ν*it     (2) 
where 
rate*i,t-1 = ratei,t-1 – 1/(T-1)*(ratei2 + ….. + rateiT) and  
ν*it = ν it – 1/(T-1)*( νi2 + ….. + νiT). 
 In the mean-transformed regression, the correlation between the transformed 
lagged dependent variable and the transformed error term is negative (Bond, 2002; 
Nickell, 1981). Therefore we expect the coefficient on the lag of the dependent 
variable in this regression to be downward biased. The order of the correlation in the 
above regression is 1/(T-1) and therefore when T becomes large, this bias disappears. 
Since applying OLS to equation (1) inflates the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable for short panels and applying Within Groups transformation 
creates a downward bias, both of these estimates are inconsistent. Bond (2002) 
suggests that the candidate for a consistent estimate should create a coefficient for 
the lagged dependent variable between these two estimates. When we apply a “first-
difference transformation” to the model in equation (1) we obtain: 
Δrateit = α Δratei,t-1 + β Δcosti,t-1 + Δνit     (3) 
                                                 
11: The monthly credit card interest rate data are available both from BRSA and CBRT for the period 
December 2005 - August 2006. Since there are small differences between these two different data 
sources for some banks, their average is used. Only the BRSA data is used for the period before 
December 2005. Only the data from CBRT is used for the period after August 2006. 
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First difference transformation removes the fixed effects but the lagged 
dependent variable in this transformation is still correlated with the error term. To 
see this, note that the term ratei,t-1 in Δratei,t-1 = ratei,t-1  - ratei,t-2 is correlated with the 
term vi,t-1 in Δνit = νit - νi,t-1. Fortunately, however, deeper lags of the lagged 
dependent variable are now uncorrelated with the transformed error term and they 
remain as instruments for the transformed lagged dependent variable in equation (3). 
IV.2. Results 
The results of the estimation of equation (1) are presented in Table 3. OLS 
gives a higher coefficient than the Within Groups estimation in the regressions as can 
be seen in the first and second columns of Table 3. Thus we can expect the consistent 
estimations to give coefficients between 0.87 and 0.75 for the lagged dependent 
variable. However, since T is relatively large (23) in our regressions, a strong bias is 
not expected in the Within Groups estimation. Hence, it is reasonable to expect the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable to be close to the Within Groups 
coefficient in a proper estimation of this dynamic panel data model. 
Table 3: Empirical Results 
 1 2 3 
Dep Var: Rate OLS 
Within 
Groups 
(Fixed Ef.) 
System 
GMM  
(t-2 t-3) 
Lag of rate 0.87 0.75 0.75 
p value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    
Lag of cost of fund 0.13 0.22 0.37 
p value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.93 0.92  
m1   0 
m2   0.099 
Sargan Test   1 
Instrument count   26 
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Number of steps in GMM   2 
Time period: 2001q2-2006q4 (23 periods) 
Number of observations: 496 
Number of cross-sections (banks): 22 
 
Two-step system GMM is run to estimate the model without biases. The 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (0.75) is almost equal to the Within 
Groups estimation. The m1 test shows that there is a first order serial correlation in 
the transformed error terms as expected, and the second order serial correlation is 
rejected by the m2 test12; hence, using the second lag of the dependent variable as an 
instrument for the transformed lagged dependent variable is possible.13 
The two-step system GMM estimation gives a coefficient of 0.37 for the lag 
of the cost of the funds. This coefficient indicates that a 10 percent decline in the cost 
of fund results in 3.7 percent reduction in credit card interest rates. Although this 
coefficient is statistically significant, in economic terms it is not a very substantial 
amount. In other words, credit card interest rates adjust to the changes in the cost of 
funds at a sluggish rate. This result provides empirical evidence for the lack of price 
competition in the Turkish credit card market. 
Note that the Hansen test of joint validity does not work properly and it gives 
extremely good results such as a p value equal to 1 because the number of 
instruments (26) exceeds the number of the cross-sections (22) in this system GMM 
                                                 
12 In Table 3 and 4, m1 and m2 are the Arellano and Bond tests for first and second order serial 
correlation, asymptotically N(0,1). The reported values for m1 and m2 are the p-values for the null 
hypothesis of no-serial correlation. In the OLS estimation they test the serial correlation in levels 
residuals, and in GMM-estimations they test the first differenced residuals. 
13 First order serial correlation in the first differenced residuals is expected by construction since Δ ν it 
=  ν it -  ν i,t-1 and Δ ν i,t-1 =  ν i,t-1 -  ν i,t-2 share the same term,  ν i,t-1. What we need to check is the second 
order correlation in the first differenced residuals. The reason is that if there is a correlation between Δ 
ν it =  ν it -  ν i,t-1 and Δ ν i,t-2 =  ν i,t-2 -  ν i,t-3, this indicates a first order correlation in levels due to the 
correlation between the vi,t-1 in first and vi,t-2 in the latter. If we find a second order correlation in 
differenced residuals, we can no longer use the twice lag of the dependent variable, ratei,t-2, as an 
instrument for the first differenced lag of the dependent variable, Δratei,t-1, and therefore we need to 
use deeper lags of the dependent variable. 
 18
estimation14. 
Simulations show that if the panel series at hand are highly persistent, i.e. if 
they exhibit a pattern close to a random walk, then applying a “difference GMM” 
performs poorly and the results could be improved by using what is called a system 
GMM. To check for persistency, the credit card interest rates are regressed on their 
own lags and on time dummies. Bond (2002) shows in simulations that System 
GMM gives the best result in checking for persistency in panel data series. The 
results of these estimations are reported in Table 4, along with OLS and Within 
Group estimations which are presented for comparison. The coefficient on the lag of 
rate is 0.73 in the two-step system GMM regression and it is statistically significant. 
Table 4: Persistency of credit card rates 
 
GMM Sys 
t-2 t-3 
GMM Dif 
t-2 t-3 
GMM Dif 
t-3 t-4 
Lag of rate 0,73 0,64 0,84 
p value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared    
m1 0,002 0,003 0,002 
m2 0,022 0,008 0,017 
Sargan-Hansen Test 1  1 
Instrument count 25/22 23/22 23/22 
Steps in GMM 2 1 1 
 
V. Conclusion 
This study analyses price competition in the Turkish credit card market. In a 
competitive spot market model, a close connection is expected between credit card 
interest rates and the cost of funds for the credit card issuers (Ausubel, 1991). 
                                                 
14 Since the instrument matrix creates one column for each period and lag available to that period, the 
number of instruments is quadratic in T. In the literature, as a rule of thumb, limiting the instrument 
count with the number of cross-sections in the regression is recommended. There is no universal rule, 
however, and therefore instrument counts are also reported in Table 3 and 4 following the advice of 
Windmeijer (2005). When the number of instruments exceeds the number of cross-sections, the 
Sargan-Hansen test of joint validity does not work properly and it gives extremely good results such 
as a p-value equal to 1 (Hansen, 1982). 
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However, credit card interest rates did not appear to respond much to the decline in 
the cost of funds in different countries and in different periods. We empirically 
analyze the response of credit card interest rates to the changes in the cost of funds in 
Turkey during the period 2001-2006. A quarterly data set of the credit card interest 
rates for all 22 issuers in the market is employed in an empirical model where these 
rates are regressed on their own lags, the lags of the cost of the funds, and time 
dummies. This regression is the first in literature to be estimated free of dynamic 
panel bias. In this dynamic panel data setting, the two-step system GMM estimations 
yield a statistically significant but economically weak coefficient on the response of 
credit card interest rates to the changes in the cost of funds. The paper thus provides 
empirical evidence for the failure of price competition in the Turkish credit card 
market. 
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